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RESUMEN: En diciembre de 1999, la revista Time eligió a Albert 
Einstein “The Person of the Century”. Fue, no cabe duda, una 
elección razonable, pero, como se argumenta en este artículo, 
existen también buenos argumentos para sostener que Turing 
podría haber recibido tal honor. En apoyo de semejante tesis 
están sus trabajos puramente científicos, que se esbozan aquí, 
trabajos que entroncan con la mejor tradición matemática, y 
cómo afectaron al desarrollo matemático, siendo finalmente 
instrumentales en la configuración de un nuevo mundo 
tecnológico, tanto en lo que al cálculo y manejo de información 
se refiere, como en lo relativo al establecimiento de nuevas 
formas de relaciones sociales. Relacionadas con lo anterior, 
se encuentran las aportaciones que hizo durante la Segunda 
Guerra Mundial al desciframiento de códigos secretos, que, 
en cierto sentido, metafórico, se pueden considerar como una 
nueva herramienta para socavar la privacidad, ese derecho civil 
cuya negación arruinó su propia vida.
PALABRAS CLAVE: matemáticas; lógica; criptografía; inteligencia 
artificial; informática.
ABSTRACT: In December 1999, “Time” magazine chose Albert 
Einstein as “Person of the Century.” This was undoubtedly a 
reasonable choice, but as I will argue in this article, there are also 
good reasons for contending that Turing might have received 
this honor. One such reason I consider here is his purely scientific 
work, which stems from the greatest mathematical tradition, 
and how it affected the development of mathematics itself and 
was finally instrumental in shaping a new technological world. 
This is true both as regards the computation and treatment 
of information as well as the establishment of new forms of 
social relations. In relation to the foregoing, we have Turing’s 
contributions to the deciphering of secret codes during the 
Second World War, which in a somewhat metaphorical sense 
may be regarded as a new tool for undermining personal 
privacy, that civil right whose denial finally ruined his life.
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INTRODUCTION
The December 31st, 1999 issue of Time, the weekly 
American journal, had on its cover a photograph of 
Albert Einstein under the heading of “Person of the 
Century.” What were the criteria that guided Time in 
its choice? This is what the editors of Time had to say 
on the matter:
“So how can we go about choosing the Person of the 
Century, the one who, for better or worse, personified 
our times and will be recorded by history as having 
the most lasting significance?
Let’s begin by noting what our century will be remem-
bered for. Out of the fog of proximity, three great 
themes emerge:
· The grand struggle between totalitarianism and 
democracy.
· The ability of courageous individuals to resist 
authority in order to secure their civil rights.
· The explosion of scientific and technical knowl-
edge that unveiled the mysteries of the universe 
and helped secure the triumph of freedom by 
unleashing the power of free minds and free 
markets.”
Confronted with these grand themes, Time chose 
three finalists: Franklin D. Roosevelt, Mohandas 
Gandhi and Albert Einstein. I will have more to say 
later about Roosevelt and Gandhi, but let me begin 
with Einstein.
THE CENTURY OF SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY
The opening article, signed by Walter Isaacson 
(1999), reads as follows: “In a century that will be re-
membered foremost for its science and technology 
– in particular for our ability to understand and then 
harness the forces of the atom and the universe – one 
person stands out as both the greatest mind and para-
mount icon of our age: the kindly, absentminded pro-
fessor whose wild halo of hair, piercing eyes, engaging 
humanity and extraordinary brilliance made his face 
a symbol and his name a synonym for genius: Albert 
Einstein.”
“A century that will be remembered foremost for 
its science and technology”, wrote Isaacson, and in-
deed I agree with him. Of course, Einstein was a good 
choice. However, I will argue that another plausible 
choice, though certainly not so popular, would have 
been Alan Turing (1912-1954).
As arguments in favor of Einstein, Time mentioned 
his contributions to quantum physics, the two theo-
ries of relativity (the special and the general) and the 
relativistic cosmology that led to a new understand-
ing of the Universe. They were indeed impressive 
contributions having far-reaching consequences, not 
only scientific and technological but also philosophi-
cal and cultural, but now, living as we do in a new 
century and possessing a broader perspective of the 
scientific and technological innovations of the XXth 
century that exerted the greatest influence on the 
future, were they really those associated with Ein-
stein’s name?
It is difficult to answer to this question. The deep 
meaning of the special and general theories of rela-
tivity, with all they tell us about such basic concepts 
as space and time, makes it hard to deny their funda-
mental importance when compared with practically 
any other scientific theory. In a similar way, although 
not in the same sense as relativity to space and time, 
we might also speak about quantum physics. Actu-
ally, as far as its social (political and economic) conse-
quences are concerned, quantum physics has proved 
to be far more important than relativity (we only have 
to think about the transistor), although in this case 
Einstein was simply one more name alongside others, 
especially Max Planck, Niels Bohr, Werner Heisenberg 
and Erwin Schrödinger.
If we look around, a possible answer to the question 
of what the most important innovation for our XXIst 
society is might be found in all the gadgets and control 
systems which make Globalization possible - what we 
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call the Information Era - and it is here where Alan 
Turing’s name stands out very prominently. Of course, 
I do not mean to say that his is the only name to con-
sider, but his position is reinforced if we take into ac-
count the number and diversity of his contributions 
- to logic, mathematics, cryptanalysis, philosophy, and 
formatively to the areas later known as computer sci-
ence, cognitive science, artificial intelligence and ar-
tificial life.
Actually, Time recognized the importance of Glo-
balization: “Even more central to this globalization” 
wrote Isaacson after referring to Henry Ford and the 
Wright brothers, “were the electronic technologies 
that revolutionized the distribution of information, 
ideas and entertainment.” And at this point he men-
tioned Turning, but only very briefly: “In the 1930s 
Alan Turing first described the computer – a machine 
that could perform logical functions based on what-
ever instructions were fed to it – and then proceeded 
to help build one in the early 1940s that cracked the 
German wartime codes. His concepts were refined by 
other computer pioneers: John von Neumann, John 
Atanasoff, J. Presper Eckert and John Mauchly.”
FOUNDATIONS OF MATHEMATICS
To mention Turing only in connection with com-
puters is a great misunderstanding. He belongs to a 
mathematical movement or tradition that during the 
second half of the XIXth century dramatically changed 
the very idea of mathematics. A more detailed presen-
tation however should also necessarily include Galois, 
who was highly influential in converting mathemat-
ics into the study of structures; Lobachevskii, Bolyai 
and Riemann with their non-Euclidean geometries; 
Felix Klein with his Erlangen Program in which he put 
forward the idea that there are as many geometries 
as transformation groups, and George Cantor, with 
his theory of transfinite numbers, which gave a new 
dimension to set theory. As forerunners to the math-
ematical tradition to which Turing belonged, I would 
also mention George Boole (1815-1864) and David 
Hilbert (1862-1943).
In the opening lines of An Investigation on the Laws 
of Thought (1854), Boole wrote:
“The design of the following treatise is to investigate 
the fundamental laws of those operations of the mind 
by which reasoning is performed; to give expression 
to them in the symbolic language of a Calculus, and 
upon this foundation to establish the science of Logic 
and construct its method; to make that method itself 
the basis of a general method for the application of 
the mathematical doctrine of Probabilities; and, fi-
nally, to collect from the various elements of truth 
brought to view in the course of these inquires some 
probable intimations concerning the nature and con-
stitution of the human mind.”
And further later on in the book, almost at the end 
of chapter II:
“Let us conceive […] of an Algebra in with symbols x, y, 
z, etc. admit indifferently of 0 and 1, and of these val-
ues alone. The laws, the axioms, and the processes, of 
such an Algebra will be identical in their whole extent 
with the laws, the axioms, and the processes of an 
Algebra of Logic.” 
Boole of course was speaking about what we now 
know as “digitalization.”
As to Hilbert, in 1899 he published a book, Grund-
lagen der Geometrie (Foundations of Geometry), in 
which in a sense he went further than Lobachevskii, 
Bolyai and Riemann by axiomatizing geometry com-
pletely, showing the purely formal character that al-
gebra and analysis had already achieved. Although we 
can say that such a work shed light on the foundations 
of mathematics, it is not of the sort of approach to 
which I wish to refer now. However, Hilbert also con-
tributed to the foundations of mathematics under-
stood in that sense, most importantly in the lecture 
he delivered at the eighth International Congress of 
Mathematicians held in Bologna in 1928 (it was the 
first time since the First World War that a German del-
egation had participated in these Congresses, with a 
group of 67 mathematicians headed by Hilbert).
In the paper he read in Bologna, Hilbert addressed 
a very important problem, the so-called Entschei-
dungsproblem, or “decision problem”, with the aim 
of showing if an algorithm existed for deciding if a 
mathematical proposition is a logical consequence 
of others, a subject that he had already considered 
in his famous 1900 Paris lecture, as part of problem 
number 2 (“The compatibility of the arithmetic axi-
oms”) (Hilbert, 1902)2. It is interesting to quote some 
of what Hilbert said in Bologna (Hilbert, 1929, 1930):
“In a series of presentations in the course of the last 
years I have […] embarked upon a new way of dealing 
with fundamental questions. With this new founda-
tion of mathematics, which one can conveniently call 
proof theory, I believe the fundamental questions in 
mathematics are finally eliminated, by making every 
mathematical statement a concretely demonstrable 
and strictly derivable formula […]
In mathematics there is no ignorabimus, rather we are 
always able to answer meaningful questions, and it is 
𝖃𝖐𝕾Ꮩ⊔⊂⊃ ∀
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established, as Aristotle perhaps anticipated, that our 
reason involves no mysterious arts of any kind: rather 
it proceeds according to formulatable rules that are 
completely definite – and are as well the guarantee of 
the absolute objectivity of its judgments.”
Of course, Hilbert could not imagine that only three 
years later, in 1931, the Austrian logician Kurt Gödel 
(1906-1978) would demonstrate that indeed there 
is ignorabimus in mathematics; that mathematical 
statements exist that are incomplete and undecidable; 
more specifically, that the formal system of arithme-
tic set out by Alfred North Whitehead and Bertrand 
Russell in their seminal Principia Mathematica (1910, 
1912, 1913) is, if consistent, incomplete; that is, if the 
system, the basic mathematical system, is consistent, 
there are true statements of arithmetic that are not 
provable in the system (Gödel, 1931). Gödel’s result 
ranks among the most important results in the entire 
history of science, with implications that go far be-
yond mathematics, affecting philosophy deeply, much 
as Einstein’s conception of space and time did.
In 1936, and partially using Gödel’s results, the 
American logician Alonzo Church (1903-1995) tack-
led Hilbert’s Entscheidungsproblem and arrived at the 
conclusion – in the last sentence of the paper – that “if 
the system of Principia Mathematica be ω-consistent, 
its Entscheidungsproblem is unsolvable” (Church, 
1936a; Church, 1936b; Church, 1936c). Church’s re-
sults had already been published when in April Turing 
presented a draft of a paper in which he also tackled 
Hilbert’s Entscheidungsproblem, to one of his teach-
ers at Cambridge (Turing had joined Cambridge Uni-
versity in October 1931), the topologist Maxwell H. A. 
Newman (1897-1984) a lecturer in Mathematics there 
since 19273. In May, while Newman was still studying 
Turing’s paper, he received an offprint of Church’s ar-
ticle. However, he believed Turing’s approach to be 
different and in some respects more attractive and 
powerful than Church’s, and told his young disciple 
so. Somewhat relieved, Turing published his article4. 
It was his famous “On computable numbers, with an 
application to the Entscheidungsproblem” (1937)5.
This now famous article began as follows: “The 
‘computable’ numbers may be described briefly as the 
real numbers whose expressions as a decimal are cal-
culable by finite means. Although the subject of this 
paper is ostensibly computable numbers. it is almost 
equally easy to define and investigate computable 
functions of an integral variable or a real or comput-
able variable, computable predicates, and so forth. 
The fundamental problems involved are, however, the 
same in each case, and I have chosen the computable 
numbers for explicit treatment as involving the least 
cumbrous technique”. It soon went on to point out:
“Although the class of computable numbers is so 
great, and in many ways similar to the class of real 
numbers, it is nevertheless enumerable. In § 81 
examine certain arguments which would seem to 
prove the contrary. By the correct application of one 
of these arguments, conclusions are reached which 
are superficially similar to those of Gödel. These re-
sults have valuable applications. In particular, it is 
shown (§11) that the Hilbertian Entscheidungsprob-
lem can have no solution.” Conscious of Church’s 
work, Turing immediately added: “In a recent paper 
Alonzo Church has introduced an idea of ‘effective 
calculability’, which is equivalent to my ‘comput-
ability’, but is very differently defined. Church also 
reaches similar conclusions about the Entscheidung-
sproblem. The proof of equivalence between ‘com-
putability’ and ‘effective calculability’ is outlined in 
an appendix to the present paper.”
Since Church preceded Turing in the demonstration 
of Hilbert’s Entscheidungsproblem, one might won-
der why we now especially remember Turing and not 
Church. The answer to this relevant question is that 
Church’s procedure, the so called “lambda calculus”, 
was more involved and did not offer the possibilities 
that Turing’s did. Gödel, for example, used to refer to 
Turing and not to Church. Thus, as regards the ques-
tion of whether to include one or two of the papers 
that Gödel had published in 1934, together with his 
1931 classic, as appendices to the book Gödel’s Proof 
that Ernest Nagel (1901-1985) and James R. Newman 
(1907-1966) had written (it was finally published by 
New York University Press in 1958, without Gödel’s ar-
ticles), Gödel wrote Nagel, from Princeton, on March 
14, 1957 (Gödel, 2003): “Considerable advances 
have been made in these questions since 1934. Not 
to mention other things, it was only by Turing’s work 
that it became completely clear that my proof is ap-
plicable to every formal system containing arithmetic. 
I think the reader has the right to be informed about 
the present state of affairs.”
The following year, in an article published in Dia-
lectica, Gödel commented again on Turing’s paper 
(Gödel, 1958):
“As is well-known, A. M. Turing, using the notion of a 
computing machine, gave a definition of the comput-
able function of the first order. But, had this notion 
not already been intelligible, the question of whether 
Turing’s definition is adequate would be meaningless 
[…]
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It is well-known that A. M. Turing has given an elabo-
rate definition of the concept of a mechanically com-
putable function of natural numbers. This definition 
most certainly was not superfluous. However, if the 
term ‘mechanically computable’ had not had a clear, 
although unanalyzed, meaning before, the question 
as to whether Turing’s definition is adequate would 
be meaningless, while it undoubtedly has an affirma-
tive answer.”
Of course, it is clear why Gödel was interested in 
Turing’s works: Turing’s contribution gave a more gen-
eral definition of formal system, something that al-
lowed Gödel to refine later his theorem showing that 
incompleteness could “be proved rigorously for every 
consistent formal system containing a certain amount 
of finitary number theory.” (Gödel, 1974)6.
In the same year that “On computable numbers” 
appeared, and following the suggestion by Newman, 
Turing left his fellowship at King’s College, Cambridge 
(he had been elected fellow of King’s in 1935), for the 
United States and Princeton University, where in ad-
dition to Church he found luminaries such as Albert 
Einstein, John von Neumann and Herman Weyl, the 
latter three at the Institute for Advanced Studies, 
as well as Solomon Lefschetz, while Richard Cour-
ant and Godfrey H. Hardy were visitors that year. He 
had hoped to find Gödel, but he was not there. “The 
mathematics department here,” he wrote home on 
October 6, 1936, “comes fully up to expectations. 
There is a great number of the most distinguished 
mathematicians here. J. v. Neumann, Weyl, Courant, 
Hardy, Einstein, Lefschetz, as well as hosts of smaller 
fry. Unfortunatelly there are not nearly so many logic 
people here as last year. Church is here of course, but 
Gödel, Kleene, Rosser and Bernays who were here last 
year have left. I don’t think I mind very much missing 
any of these except Gödel. Kleene and Rosser are, I 
imagine, just disciples of Church and have not much 
to offer that I could not get from Church. Bernays [I] 
think is getting rather ’vieux jeu’: that is the impres-
sion I get from his writings, but if I were to meet him I 
might get a different impression”7.
Under Church’s supervision Turing, who spent the 
years 1936-1938 at Princeton, wrote a Ph.D. enti-
tled Systems of Logic Based on Ordinals8. According 
to Solomon Feferman, it “was the first systematic at-
tempt to deal with the natural idea of overcoming 
the Gödelian incompleteness of formal systems by 
iterating the adjunction of statements – such as the 
consistency of the system – that ‘ought to’ have been 
accepted but were not derivable; in fact these kinds 
of iterations can be extended into the transfinite”9.
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TURING MACHINES AND COMPUTERS
In his 1936 paper, Turing introduced his famous 
“Turing machine.” Basically, a Turing Machine consists 
of a scanner and a limitless memory-tape that moves 
back and forth past the scanner. The tape is divided 
into squares, each of which may be blank or may bear 
a single symbol; for example: 1 or 0. In other words, 
the Turing machine gave reality to Boole’s theoretical 
idea of digitalization. As a matter of fact, Turing em-
phasized this characteristic of the new computing en-
gines. Thus, in a lecture he delivered on February 20, 
1947 at the London Mathematical Society he stated 
(Copeland, 2004):
“The automatic computing engine now being de-
signed at N.P.L. [National Physical Laboratory] is a 
typical large scale electronic digital computing ma-
chine […] From the point of view of the mathemati-
cian, the property of being digital should be of greater 
interest that that of being electronic. That it is elec-
tronic is certainly important because these machines 
owe their high speed to this, and without the speed 
it is doubtful if financial support for their construc-
tion would be forthcoming. But this is virtually all that 
there is to be said on that subject. That the machine is 
digital however has more subtle significance. It means 
firstly that numbers are represented by sequences of 
digits which can be as long as one wishes. One can 
therefore work to any desired degree of accuracy […] 
A second advantage of digital computing machines is 
that they are not restricted in their applications to any 
particular type of problem.”
According to Copeland, who edited Turing’s main 
papers and lectures, “On computable numbers” “is 
regarded as the founding publication of the modern 
science of computing. It contributed vital ideas to the 
development, in the 1940s, of the electronic stored-
program digital computer. [It] is the birthplace of the 
fundamental principle of the modern computer, the 
idea of controlling the machine’s operations by means 
of a program of coded instructions stored in the com-
puter’s memory.” (see Copeland, 2004)
As Copeland pointed out, Turing was not the only 
the theoretical mind to have produced an idea ba-
sic for the development of computers: he was also 
involved in their construction. We do not know, and 
cannot know, whether he would have developed such 
interests if the political events had been different, 
but the fact is that what happened shortly after he 
returned to England prompted him in such directions.
It was in the summer of 1938 when Turing returned 
to Cambridge, to his fellowship at King’s College, al-
though not for long: in September 1939, soon after 
the outbreak of the Great War, which in due course 
would be named the First World War, he moved to the 
headquarters of the Government Code and Cypher 
School at Bletchley Park10. There Turing participated 
in the decryption of messages sent by the German 
military encrypting machine called the Enigma. Tur-
ing’s main contribution was the design of a machine 
called a “Bombe”, which proved very effective in de-
ducing the settings of Enigma on a particular day (for 
which the seizure beforehand of a code book from a 
German captured submarine by the British proved to 
be essential). To help the Americans to build their own 
Bombes, Turing spent several months in the United 
States: he departed on November 1942 and returned 
on March 1943.
Before Turing left England for America, he had be-
come involved at Bletchley Park in another problem: 
how to translate the German messages sent by a 
machine, called Tunny, which encrypted teleprinter 
messages. He invented a method, known as Turing-
ery, with which those messages could be read. Build-
ing on Turing’s method, a group directed by Turing’s 
teacher, Max Newman, in which the telephone engi-
neer Thomas Flowers (1905-1998) played a leading 
role, designed more general methods of attacking 
Tunny that were eventually implemented in Colos-
sus, the first electronic computer (it preceded by two 
years ENIAC, the Electronic Numerical Integrator And 
Computer designed and constructed at the University 
of Pennsylvania). Although it was an engineering mar-
vel (it contained 1,500 vacuum tubes), Colossus was 
unlike a modern computer: to set the machine up for 
a new job, it was necessary to change some of the 
machine’s wiring manually by means of switches and 
plugs. It became operational on February 1944. The 
timing of the D-day landings was based on intelligence 
produced by this computer.
Peter Hilton (1923-2010), another of the mathema-
ticians who worked in Bletchley Park, recalled Turing’s 
work there in the following terms (Hilton, 1989):
“It is a rare experience to meet an authentic genius. 
Those of us privileged to inhabit the world of schol-
arship are familiar with the intellectual stimulation 
furnished by talented colleagues. We can admire the 
ideas they share with us and are usually able to un-
derstand their source; we may even often believe that 
we ourselves could have created such concepts and 
originated such thoughts. However, the experience of 
sharing the intellectual life of a genius is entirely dif-
ferent; one realizes that one is in the presence of an 
intelligence, a sensibility of such profundity and origi-
nality that one is filled with wonder and excitement.
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Alan Turing was such a genius, and those, like myself, 
who had the astonishing and unexpected opportu-
nity, created by the strange exigencies of the Second 
World War, to be able to count Turing as colleague 
and friend will never forget that experience, nor can 
we ever lose its immense benefit to us.
Turing was a mathematician, a logician, a scientist, a 
philosopher – in short, a thinker […]
Much has been written in recent years of the astonish-
ing success of ‘Britain’s secret weapon’ […] Others of 
us shared the excitement of successful achievement; 
some, like the mathematician Max Newman, deserved 
great credit for providing the organizational framework 
– not to be confused with its antithesis of bureaucratic 
structure – essential to the full exploitation of that suc-
cess; but Turing stood alone in his total comprehension 
of the nature of the problem and in devising its solu-
tion – essentially by inventing the computer.”
Also worth quoting is what Max Newman, Turing’s 
mentor at Cambridge and colleague at Bletchley Park, 
said in the obituary he wrote for the Royal Society 
(Newman, 1955):
“In 1938 Turing returned to Cambridge; in 1939 the 
war broke out. For the next six years he was fully oc-
cupied with his duties for the Foreign Office. These 
years were happy enough, perhaps the happiest of 
his life, with full scope for his inventiveness, a mild 
routine to shape the day, and a congenial set of fel-
low-workers. But the loss of his scientific work of the 
years between the ages of 27 and 33 was a cruel one. 
Three remarkable papers written just before the war, 
on three diverse mathematical subjects, show the 
quality of the work that might have been produced if 
he had settled down to work on some big problem at 
that crucial time.”
In any event, everything that was produced during 
the war convinced Turing of the possibilities and fea-
sibility of computers. Thus, he declined an offer of a 
Cambridge University lectureship, accepting instead 
in 1945 a position at the National Physical Labora-
tory to form part of a group dedicated to the design, 
construction and use of a large automatic computing 
machine. He stayed there for three years, contributing 
to the design of the first plan of that computer, ACE. 
In 1948, he accepted a Readership at Manchester Uni-
versity, where he was appointed Assistant Director of 
Madam, the Manchester Automatic Digital Machine 
designed by F. C. Williams and T. Kilburn that appar-
ently had at the time the largest memory storage ca-
pacity. Soon after, in June 1949 a journalist from The 
Times asked him in a telephone interview about the 
possibilities of the machine. Published on June 11, Tu-
ring was quoted to have said:11
“We have to have some experience with the machine 
before we know its capabilities. It may take years be-
fore we settle down to the new possibilities but I do 
not see why it should not enter any one of the fields 
normally covered by the human intellect, and eventu-
ally compete on equal terms. I do not think you can 
even draw the line about sonnets, though the com-
parison is perhaps a little bit unfair because a sonnet 
written by a machine will be better appreciated by 
another machine.”
ANOTHER LETTER, NOT SO FAMOUS AS EINSTEIN’S
It is well-known that Albert Einstein wrote a letter 
to President Roosevelt asking him to promote nuclear 
research in view of the danger posed by German sci-
entists who having discovered the fission of uranium 
in December 1938, might be able to produce an atom-
ic bomb. On October 21, 1941, together with a few 
colleagues (W. G. Welchman, C. H. O’D. Alexander and 
P. S. Milner-Barry), Turing also wrote a letter in a simi-
lar vein to Winston Churchill asking him to help in a 
scientific and technological project. As one of my pur-
poses in this paper is to compare Einstein and Turing, 
as well as to point out the special status of the former 
in the history of the XXth century, his preoccupations 
and interventions in social and political matters are in-
variably mentioned, I quote the opening paragraphs 
from that letter:12
“Dear Prime Minister,
Some weeks ago you paid us the honour of a visit, 
and we believed that you regard our work as impor-
tant. You will have seen that, thanks largely to the 
energy and foresight of Commander Travis, we have 
been well supplied with the ‘bombes’ for the break-
ing of the German Enigma codes. We think, how-
ever, that you ought to know that this work is being 
held up, and in some cases is not being done at all, 
principally because we cannot get sufficient staff to 
deal with it. Our reason for writing direct is that for 
months we have done everything that we possible 
can through the normal channels, and that we de-
spair of any early improvement without your inter-
vention. No doubt in the long run these particular 
requirements will be met, but meanwhile still more 
precious months will have been wasted and as our 
needs are continually expanding we see little hope 
of ever being adequately staffed.”
TECHNOSCIENCE
Logicians such as Boole, Russell, Whitehead, Gödel 
and Church were impressive mathematicians and lo-
gicians who can certainly hold their own with Turing 
as regards the importance of their contributions to 
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the foundations of mathematics, but none of them 
had what Turing had: the interest in and ability to 
contribute to technology as well. It is not only, nor 
mainly, that “On computable numbers” contained 
the essential ideas of the computer, but rather that 
Turing combined a wide range of mathematical ad-
vances with far-sighted applications. This aspect of 
his personality and work was recognized early on; 
what follows is taken from an obituary published in 
the Manchester Guardian in June 11, 1954, under 
the title of “Dr. Alan Turing. An appreciation,” and 
written by a certain M. H. A. N:
“In the death of Alan Turing, mathematics and sci-
ence have lost a great original thinker. It is in con-
nection with the big computing machines, which 
he helped to design and then to use, that he is best 
known to the general public, but it was, ironically 
enough, in the course of a ‘logical’ proof that not 
all mathematics can be mechanised that he was first 
led to give the specification of a ‘universal’ comput-
ing machine. To show that no machine can answer 
all mathematical questions, you have to say precise-
ly what you mean by a machine.
Turing’s answer to this question was theoretical in 
the sense that considerations of ‘how fast?’ and 
‘how large?’ (then irrelevant) were ignored. But it 
was a real machine, with a paper tape, and he was 
already interested at that time in the possibility of 
making it. Later he threw himself with enthusiasm 
into the work of designing a computing machine for 
practical use, making use of ideas which others had 
had independently in the meantime.
Turing took a particular delight in problems, large 
or small, that enable him to combine mathematical 
theory with experiments he could carry out, in whole 
or part, with his own hands. He was ready to tackle 
anything which combined these two interests.”
As far as I know, only John von Neumann (1903-
1957), also an extraordinary mathematician, com-
bined such abilities, both theoretical and applied13. 
So, we can say that one of the main characteristics of 
the XXth century, to the extent that a new term, Tech-
noscience, was coined to express it, was that of clos-
ing the gap between science and technology, which 
was pioneered by two specialists in the obstensibly 
more abstract science of mathematics.
Since the name of von Neumann has arisen, I would 
like to point out, following George Dyson, that they 
were quite different personalities (see Dyson, 2012):
“Turing and von Neumann were as far apart, in 
everything except their common interest in com-
puters, as it was possible to get. Von Neumann 
rarely appeared in public without a business suit; 
Turing was usually unkempt. ‘He tended to be slov-
enly,’ even his mother admits. Von Neumann spoke 
freely and with great precision; Turing’s speech was 
hesitating, as if words could not keep up with his 
thoughts. Turing stayed in hostels and was a com-
petitive long-distance runner; Von Neumann was 
resolutely nonathletic and stayed in first-class ho-
tels. Von Neumann had an eye for women, while 
Turing preferred men.
When von Neumann spoke about computing, he 
never mentioned artificial intelligence. Turing 
spoke about little else.”
ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE
One of the characteristics which often goes with 
great innovators is that they imagine – perhaps it 
would be more appropriate to say, that they dream 
– possibilities which do not materialize soon, if ever. 
Thus, Albert Einstein thought of a unified theory for 
all the forces known at the time (electromagnetism 
and gravitation), which he never achieved, and which 
when it was recreated by others took a very different 
form, in the quantum realm. One of Turing “dreams” 
was Artificial Intelligence, a field – still not named in 
that manner – in which he was the first to carry out 
substantial research, at least in what we may call a 
“modern way.”
As a matter of fact, that idea came to him in a rath-
er natural way, as an extension of his previous work 
on computers. Such a connection can readily be dis-
cerned in the already mentioned lecture that he deliv-
ered in 1947 at the London Mathematical Society (see 
Copeland, 2004):
“It has been said that computing machines can only 
carry out the processes that they are instructed to 
do. This is certainly true in the sense that if they do 
something other than what they were instructed 
then they have just made some mistake. It is also 
true that the intention in constructing these ma-
chines in the first instance is to treat them as slaves, 
giving them only jobs which have been thought out 
in detail, jobs such that the user of the machine fully 
understands what in principle is going on all the time. 
Up till the present machines have only been used in 
this way. But is it necessary that they should always 
be used in such a manner? Let us suppose we have 
set up a machine with certain initial instruction ta-
bles, so constructed that these tables might on occa-
sion, if good reason arose, modify those tables. One 
can imagine that after the machine had been oper-
ating for some time, the instructions would have al-
tered out of all recognition, but nevertheless still be 
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such that one would have to admit that the machine 
was still doing very worthwhile calculations. Possibly 
it might still be getting results of the type desired 
when the machine was first set up, but in a much 
more efficient manner. In such a case one would 
have to admit that the progress of the machine had 
not been foreseen when its original instructions 
were put in. It would be like a pupil who had learnt 
much from his master, but had added much more by 
his own work. I feel that one is obliged to regard the 
machine as showing intelligence.”
Four years later, in another lecture, this time broad-
cast by BBC Radio on May 15th, 1951, he took the op-
portunity to insist on the possibility of Artificial Intel-
ligence (see Copeland, 2004):
“Digital computers have often been described as me-
chanical brains. Most scientists probably regard this 
description as a mere newspaper stunt, but some do 
not [...] In this talk I shall […] give most attention to the 
view which I hold myself, that it is not altogether un-
reasonable to describe digital computers as brains […]
[The outlook of the majority of scientists] was well 
summed up by Lady Lovelace over a hundred years 
ago, speaking of Babbage’s Analytical Engine. She said 
[…] ‘The Analytical Engine has no pretensions whatev-
er to originate anything. It can do whatever we know 
how to order it to perform.’ This very well describes 
the way in which digital computers are actually used 
at the present time, and in which they will probably 
be used for many years to come […]
There is however [another] point of view, which I hold 
myself. I agree with Lady Lovelace’s dictum as far as it 
goes, but I believe that its validity depends on consid-
ering how digital computers are used rather than how 
they could be used. In fact I believe that they could be 
used in such a manner that they could appropriately 
be described as brains.”
Turing must also be credited with another idea, the 
so-called “Turing test,” which was followed, some-
times with opposition, by those working in the field 
of Artificial Intelligence. He put forward this idea in 
an article entitled “Computing machinery and intelli-
gence” published in Mind, a philosophical journal (see 
Copeland, 2004). Instead of quoting from it I will use a 
discussion between Turing, Newman, R.B. Braithwaite 
and G. Jefferson recorded by the BBC on 10 January 
1952, and broadcast on BBC radio on the 14th, and 
again on the 23th, of that month. On that occasion, 
Turing presented his idea on the following terms 
(Copeland, 2004):
“I don’t want to give a definition of thinking, but if I 
had to I should probably be unable to say anything 
more about it than it was a sort of buzzing that went 
on inside my head. But I don’t really see that we need 
to agree on a definition of a brain, or of a man, that 
we want to discuss, and those that we don’t. To take 
an extreme case, we are not interested in the fact 
that the brain has the consistency of cold porridge 
[…] I would like to suggest a particular kind of test 
that one might apply to a machine. You avoid begging 
the question, and say that the machines that pass 
are (let’s say) ‘Grade A’ machines. The idea is that 
the machine has to try and pretend to be a man, by 
answering questions put to it, and it will only pass if 
the pretence is reasonably convincing. –a consider-
able proportion of a jury, who should not be expert 
about machines, must be taken in by the pretence. 
They aren’t allowed to see the machine itself – that 
would make it too easy. So the machine is kept in a 
far away room and the jury are allowed to ask it ques-
tions, which are transmitted through to it: it sends 
back a typewritten answer.”
It is interesting to see what Gödel thought about 
Artificial Intelligence and, more specifically, about 
Turing’s ideas in this regard. In an alternative ver-
sion of some remarks Gödel intended to publish in 
Dialecta in 1972, brought to light in 1974 by Hao 
Wang and republished in Gödel’s Collected Works, 
he criticized an argument connected with Artificial 
Intelligence put forward by Turing in “Computable 
numbers” (Gödel, 1974):
“Turing, in Proc. Lond. Math. Soc. 42 (1936), p. 250, 
gives an argument which is supposed to show that 
mental procedures cannot carry any farther than 
mechanical procedures. However, this argument is 
inconclusive, because it depends on the supposition 
that a finite mind is capable of only a finite number of 
distinguishable states. What Turing disregards com-
pletely is the fact that mind, in its use, is not static, 
but constantly developing. This is seen, e.g., from 
the infinite series of ever stronger axioms of infinity 
in set theory, each of which expresses a new idea or 
insight. A similar process takes place with regard to 
the primitive terms. E.g., the iterative concept of set 
became clear only in the past few decades. Several 
more primitive ideas now appear on the horizon, e.g., 
the self-reflexive concept of proper class. Therefore, 
although at each stage of the mind’s development the 
number of its possible states is finite, there is no rea-
son why this number should not converge to infinity 
in the course of its development. Now there may exist 
systematic methods of accelerating, specializing, and 
uniquely determining this development, e.g. by ask-
ing the right questions on the basis of a mechanical 
procedure. But it must be admitted that the precise 
definition of a procedure of this kind would require 
a substantial deepening of our understanding of the 
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basic operations of the mind. Vaguely defined proce-
dures of this kind, however, are known, e.g., the proc-
ess of defining recursive well-orderings of integers 
representing larger and larger ordinals or the process 
of forming stronger and stronger axioms of infinity in 
set theory.”
Though I cannot develop this question here, I should 
mention that the Turing test has not been accepted by 
everybody. Among its critics are figures such as John 
Searle, who put forward the so-called “Chinese room 
argument,” and Paul and Patricia Smith Churchland14.
As to Turing’s expectations of when Artificial Intel-
ligence would be achieved, he was cautious (Cope-
land, 2004): “I believe that in about fifty years’ time 
it will be possible to program computers, with a stor-
age capacity of about 109, to make them play an imi-
tation game so well that an average interrogator will 
not have more than 70 per cent chance of making the 
right identification after five minutes of questioning. 
The original question, ‘Can machines think?’ I believe 
to be too meaningless to deserve discussion. Never-
theless I believe that at the end of the century the 
use of words and general educated thinking will have 
altered so much that one will be able to speak of ma-
chines thinking without expecting to be contradicted.”
More than fifty years have passed and Artificial In-
telligence is yet to arrive. I am not sure, however, that 
the kind of AI that Turing had in mind has not yet been 
produced, as the case of chess shows with the victory 
that the IBM “Deep Blue” computer achieved in May 
11, 1997 in its match against world-champion Garry 
Kasparov.
Indeed, to anybody interested in artificial intelli-
gence, chess is a very good playground. It is therefore 
not surprising that Turing made some excursions into 
that topic, such as the essay entitled “Chess”, which 
appeared in a collection published in 1953 under the 
title Faster than Thought15.
“When one is asked ‘Could one make a machine play 
chess?’, there are several possible meanings which 
might be given to the words. Here are a few:
i) Could one make a machine which would obey the 
rules of chess, i. e. one which would play random legal 
moves, or which could tell one whether a given move 
is a legal one?
ii) Could one make a machine which would solve 
chess problems, e.g. tell one whether, in a given posi-
tion, white has a forced mate in three?
iii) Could one make a machine which would play 
a reasonably good game of chess, i.e. which con-
fronted with an ordinary (that is, not particularly 
unusual) chess position, would after two or three 
minutes of calculation, indicate a passably good le-
gal move?
iv) Could one make a machine play chess, and im-
prove its play, game by game, profiting from its ex-
perience?”
A PRECURSOR OF NETWORKS OF ARTIFICIAL 
NEURONS (CONNECTIONISM)
Related to his interests in Artificial Intelligence, Tur-
ing also came up with what we might call “networks of 
artificial neurons”, sometimes called connectionism, 
and also neural networks. He introduced a type of 
neural network that he called a “B-type unorganised 
machine,” consisting of artificial neurons. Probably 
the best proof of his ideas in this subject was a report 
he prepared in 1948 entitled Intelligent Machinery, 
while he was working at the National Physical Labora-
tory. The typewritten manuscript is reproduced in the 
AlanTuring.net Archives, directed by Jack Copeland 
and Diane Proudfoot. The purpose of that work was 
“to investigate the question as to whether it is pos-
sible for machinery to show intelligent behavior,” and 
it is in Section 4 (“Unorganised machines”) that Turing 
introduced the idea of networks of artificial neurons:16
“So far we have been considering machines which 
are designed for a definite purpose (though the 
universal machines are in a sense an exception). 
We might instead consider what happens when we 
make up a machine in a comparatively unsystem-
atic way for some kind of standard components. 
We could consider some particular machine of this 
nature and find out what sort of things it is likely 
to do. Machines which are largely random in their 
construction in this way will be called ‘unorganised 
machines’. This does not pretend to be an accurate 
term. It is conceivable that the same machine might 
be regarded by one man as organized and by anoth-
er as unorganised.
A typical example of an unorganized machine would 
be as follows. The machine is made up from a rather 
large number N of similar units. Each unit has two in-
put terminals, and has an output terminal which can 
be connected to the input terminals of (0 or more) 
other units.”
A possibility that occurred to Turing was that the 
human brain is in fact closer to an unorganized ma-
chine than to an organized one; an unorganized ma-
chine which nevertheless is able to produce organized 
thoughts.
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FROM ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE TO ARTIFICIAL LIFE 
(MORPHOGENESIS)
Another step in Turing’s continuous intellectual devel-
opment was the work he did on Morphogenesis, the sci-
ence that studies the biological processes that cause an 
organism to develop its shape. As we can easily imagine, 
he used his expertise in computers to construct compu-
ter simulations to investigate the organization and pat-
terns in living beings. Soon after the world’s first manu-
factured general-purpose electronic digital computer, 
the Ferranti Mark I, was installed in the Computing Ma-
chine Laboratory of Manchester University, where Turing 
was working, he used it for morphogenesis studies. As 
he wrote in a February 1951 letter to Michael Woodger, 
who had worked as his assistant in 1946 at the National 
Physical Laboratory:17 “Our new machine is to start ar-
riving on Monday. I am hoping as one of the first jobs to 
do something about ‘chemical embryology.’ In particular 
I think one can account for the appearance of Fibonacci 
numbers in connection with fir-cones.” The outcome of 
such work was an article entitled “The chemical basis of 
morphogenesis”, which Turing published in 1952 in the 
Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society, and in 
which he presented a mathematical model of a grow-
ing embryo (see Copeland, 2004). Among the results he 
obtained, one was of particular importance: the dem-
onstration that certain types of dynamic systems which 
are initially homogeneous undergo a progressive change 
which leads to the appearance of spatial heterogeneity. 
And, what is life but organized systems which present 
heterogeneities?
INTERDISCIPLINARITY
As we see, Turing’s contributions to science covered 
a wide range, from the foundations of mathematics to 
cryptanalysis, computers, artificial intelligence and mor-
phogenesis, contributions that always had deep philo-
sophical implications18. His particular case, in the logi-
cal continuity that took him from one field to another, 
reminds me of Louis Pasteur, whose many and different 
contributions to science followed one after the other, 
each one motivated by the preceding one and paving the 
way to the next. Pasteur began by studying molecular 
asymmetry from a chemical and physical point of view, 
and then went on to fermentation because an optically 
active substance is involved in it; while engaged in his 
fermentation studies, he discovered the phenomenon 
now named after him, pasteurization, as well as germ 
theory, and demonstrated that the growth of bacteria 
was not due to any spontaneous generation; and from 
there he proceeded to immunology and vaccination.
Interdisciplinarity, the collaboration between spe-
cialists in different fields with the aim of understand-
ing nature better, is in my opinion an emergent field 
which continues to grow during the XXIst century, to 
the extent that it constitutes one of its main charac-
teristics19. And, in the practice of his work rather than 
an ideologue of interdisciplinarity, Alan Turing was 
both a citizen of that world and a pioneer in it.
ALAN TURING’S TRAGIC FATE
Now, let us go back to the question of the “Person 
of the Century,” and to the two finalists who, for Time, 
accompanied Einstein: Roosevelt and Gandhi.
Among the arguments used by Time in favor of 
Roosevelt, one was based on his 1941 New Year’s 
Day address, in which he said: “We look forward to a 
world founded upon four essential human freedoms: 
freedom of expression, freedom of worship, freedom 
from want, freedom from fear.” And of Gandhi, we 
read: “In a century marked by brutality, Gandhi per-
fected a different method of bringing about change, 
one that would turn out (surprisingly) to have more 
lasting impact.”
Unlike Gandhi’s civil disobedience movement, Tur-
ing did not oppose publically those who suppressed 
an individual right, the freedom of sexual expres-
sion. Indeed, Turing did not fight openly those who 
supported the penalization of homosexuality and 
consequently he himself, but rather he did so in an-
other more dramatic way: by committing suicide. Af-
ter having accepted treatment with female hormones 
(chemical castration) as an alternative to prison, he 
ate an apple injected with cyanide20. Like Gandhi, who 
did not live to see the full realization of his dream, nei-
ther did Turing live to see the social and legal accept-
ance of homosexuality in his country, and while that 
freedom is not yet fully recognized around the world, 
in his own private way Turing was a victim of the de-
nial of civil rights that existed in his time.
Summing up the merits that the Time article out-
lined in the case of Albert Einstein, we find:
“As the century’s greatest thinker, as an immigrant 
who fled from oppression to freedom, as a political 
idealist, he best embodies what historians will regard 
as significant about the 20th century. And as philoso-
pher with faith both in science and in the beauty of 
God’s handiwork, he personifies the legacy that has 
been bequeathed to the next century.
In a hundred years, as we turn to another century 
– nay, ten times a hundred years, when we turn to 
another new millennium – the name that will prove 
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most enduring from our amazing era will be that of 
Albert Einstein: genius, political refugee, humanitar-
ian, locksmith of the mysteries of the atom and the 
universe.”
With the exception, if taken literally, of the refer-
ence to his supposed “faith in the beauty of God’s 
handiwork,” such a summary is an accurate expres-
sion of Einstein’s achievements. However, it would 
also have been possible to write a moving and pre-
cise characterization of Turing’s achievements, as 
follows:
“As a humble and most creative man, who travelled 
through several of the most basic sciences created 
by humanity, adding new ideas and perspectives 
to them, without distinguishing between science 
on one side and technology on the other, thereby 
revealing a new way of perceiving Nature, Turing 
personifies the legacy that has been bequeathed to 
the next century.
As a individual who fought with the best of his abili-
ties for the freedom of his country and the world 
at a time when freedom was in serious danger, 
although that freedom was not afforded him until 
later, the name of Alan Turing will be remembered 
when the memory of his time will perhaps be but 
an obscure shadow.”
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NOTES
1 This article is an expanded version of 
the lecture I delivered at the Inter-
national Symposium The Alan Turing 
Legacy, held at the Fundación Ramón 
Areces, Madrid, October 23-24, 2012. I 
thank Prof. Manuel de León for his kind 
invitation and help with this paper.
2 Hilbert’s lecture was of course deliv-
ered in German (“Mathematische prob-
leme”). This is how Hilbert enunciated 
Problem number: “When we are en-
gaged in investigating the foundations 
of a science, we must set up a system 
of axioms which contains an exact and 
complete description of the relations 
subsisting between the elementary 
ideas of that science. The axioms so set 
up are at the same time the definitions 
of those elementary ideas; and no state-
ment within the realm of the science 
whose foundation we are testing is held 
to be correct unless it can be derived 
from those axioms by means of a finite 
number of logical steps. Upon closer con-
sideration the question arises: Whether, 
in any way, certain statements of single 
axioms depend upon one another, and 
whether the axioms may not therefore 
contain certain parts in common, which 
must be isolated if one wishes to arrive 
at a system of axioms that shall be alto-
gether independent of one another.”
3 Turing attended Newman’s lectures on 
logic in Cambridge. For more informa-
tion about Turing’s life and career, see 
Newman, 1955; Leavitt, 2006; Hodges, 
2012; Turing, 2012. 
4 My presentation of the history of this 
important chapter of the history of log-
ics is too limited. More information, 
coming from another of the protago-
nists, is contained in (Kleene, 1989). 
5 See Turing, 1937a and Turing, 1937b. 
Although received by the Proceedings 
of the London Mathematical Society on 
28 May, 1936, and read on November 
12, Turing’s paper appeared in 1937 al-
though it is sometimes referred to as if 
it had been published in 1936.
6 Both, these lectures and its postcrip-
tum, were published in Davis (1965). 
7 Reproduced in Copeland (2004, p. 127).
8 Turing’s thesis was published with the 
same title in Turing (1939). The manu-
script has been reprinted recently in Ap-
pel (2012).
9 Solomon Feferman, “Turing’s thesis,” in 
Alan Turing’s System of Logic. The Princ-
eton Thesis, op. cit., pp. 13-26; on p. 13.
10 For more first-hand information about 
Bletchley Park, see Hilton (1989).
11 Quoted in Turing (2012, p. 89).
12 Reproduced in Hilton (1989, pp. 336-337).
13 It would be interesting, though rather 
long, to explore the similarities, anal-
ogies and relations between Turing’s 
and von Neumann’s work. As men-
tioned before, Turing met von Neu-
mann in Princeton, and the Hungarian 
mathematician thought sufficiently 
highly of Turing’s talents to offer him 
a position as his assistant at the Insti-
tute for Advanced Study, which Turing 
refused, deciding to return to Eng-
land. For von Neumann’s opinions of 
Turing’s 1937 work, see, for instance 
what he wrote about Turing’s theory 
of computing automata in von Neu-
mann (1948, 1995). Also a letter von 
Neumann wrote to J. C. C. McKinsey 
on February 18, 1948, reproduced in 
von Neumann (2005).
14 See Searle (1980) and also Searle (1990) 
and Churchland and Smith (1990). 
There is a recent Spanish edition of 
these two papers: John R. Searle, “¿Es la 
mente un programa informático?” and 
P. M. Churchland and P. Smith Church-
land “¿Podría pensar una máquina?”, 
Investigación y Ciencia. Temas, n.º 68 
(“La ciencia después de Alan Turing”), 
2º trimestre 2012, pp. 83-89, 90-96.
15 Actually, the title Turing gave to this es-
say in his typescript was “Digital com-
puters applied to games.”
16 Reproduced in AlanTuring.net (“The Turing 
Archive for the History of Computing”).
17 Reproduced in AlanTuring.net (“The Turing 
Archive for the History of Computing”).
18 I have not dealt with another field 
which Turing influenced: linguistics. As 
a mere example of such influence, I will 
reproduce part of the abstract from an 
article by Noan Chomsky, the great lin-
guist: “A grammar can be regarded as a 
device that enumerates the sentences 
of a language. We study a sequence of 
restrictions that limit grammars first to 
Turing machines, then to two types of 
systems from which a phrase structure 
description of the generated language 
can be drawn and finally state Markov 
sources (finite automata).” See Chom-
sky (1959).
19 I have developed this thesis in Sánchez 
Ron (2011). For a general evaluation of 
the interdisciplinary studies, see Frode-
man (2010). 
20 There are people who think that Turing 
did not commit suicide, but that he ate 
an apple which had been contaminated 
accidentally.
ARBOR Vol. 189-764, noviembre-diciembre 2013, a085. ISSN-L: 0210-1963 doi: http://dx.doi.org/10.3989/arbor.2013.764n6008
A
lan Turing: Person of the XXth Century?
14
a085
REFERENCES
Appel, A.W. (Ed.) (2012). Alan Turing’s Sys-
tem of Logic. The Princeton Thesis. Prin-
ceton: Princeton University Press.
Chomsky, N. (1959). “On certain formal 
properties of grammars”. Information 
and Control, 2, pp. 137-167.
Church, A. (1936a). “An unsolvable problem 
of elementary number theory”. Ameri-
can Journal of Mathematics, 58, pp. 
345-363.
Church, A. (1936b). “A note on the Entsc-
heidungsproblem”. Journal of Symbolic 
Logic, 1, pp. 40-41. 
Church, A. (1936c). “A note on the Entsc-
heidungsproblem, Correction”. Journal 
of Symbolic Logic, 1, pp. 101-102.
Churchland, P. M and Smith Churchland, P. 
(1990). “Could a machine think?”. Sci-
entific American, 262 (1), pp. 26-31 and 
pp. 32-37.
Copeland, J. (ed.) (2004). The Essential Tur-
ing. Oxford: Clarendon Press, p. 127.
Davis, M. (ed.) (1965). The undecidable: Ba-
sic Papers on Undecidable Propositions, 
Unsolvable Problems and Computable 
Functions. Hewlett, N. Y.: Raven Press, 
pp. 39-74.
Dyson, G. (2012). Turing’s Cathedral. New 
York: Pantheon Books, p. 259.
Frodeman, R. (ed.) (2010). The Oxford 
Handbook of Interdisciplinarity. Oxford: 
Oxford University Press.
Gödel, K. (1931). “Über formal unentschei-
dbare Sätze der Principia Mathematica 
und verwandter Systeme I”. Monant-
shefter für Mathematik und Physik, 38, 
pp. 173-198.
Gödel, K. (2003). Collected Works, vol. V 
(Correspondence H-Z), S. Feferman, J. 
W. Dawson, jr., W. Goldfarb, Ch. Parsons 
and W. Sieg, eds.; Clarendon Press, Ox-
ford, p. 147.
Gödel, K. (1958). “Über eine bisher noch 
nicht benützte Erweiterung des fi-
niten Standpunktes” (“On a hitherto 
unutilized extension of the finitary 
standpoint”). Dialectica 12, pp. 280-
287; pp. 245, 275.
Gödel, K. (1934). “Postcriptum” to On un-
decidable propositions of formal math-
ematical systems (mimeographed lec-
ture notes delivered in 1934). Published 
in Martin Davis (ed.), The undecidable: 
Basic Papers on Undecidable Proposi-
tions, Unsolvable Problems and Com-
putable Functions. Hewlett, N. Y.: Raven 
Press, pp. 39-74.
Gödel, K. (1974). “Some remarks on the 
undecidability results”. In Hao Wang, 
From Mathematics to Philosophy. New 
York: Routledge and Kegan Paul, pp. 
325-326.
Hilbert, D. (1902). “Problèmes futures des 
Mathématiques”. In Compte Rendu du 
Deuxième Congrès International des 
Mathématiciens tenu a Paris du 6 au 
12 Aout 1900, Gauthier-Villars, Paris, 
pp. 58-114.
Hilbert, D. (1929, 1930). “Probleme der 
Grundlegung der Mathematik”. Atti del 
Congresso Internazionale dei Matemati-
ci. Bologna 3-10 Settembre 1928, tome I. 
Nicola Zanichelli, Bologna 192), pp. 135-
141; also published in Mathematische 
Annalen 102, 1-9 (1930); pp. 3-9.
Hilton, P. (1989). “Reminiscences of Bletch-
ley Park, 1942-1945” In A Century of 
Mathematics in America, Part I, pp. 
291-301.
Hodges, A. (2012). Alan Turing: The Enigma. 
Simon and Schuster, New York 1983; 
new edition: Random House, London. 
Isaacson, W. (1999). “Who mattered and 
why”, Time, December 31, 1999.
Kleene, S.C. (1989). “The role of logical 
investigations in Mathematics since 
1930”. In A Century of Mathematics in 
America, Part I, Peter Duren, ed.; Amer-
ican Mathematical Society, Providence, 
Rhode Island, pp. 85-94.
Leavitt, D. (2006). The Man Who Knew too 
Much: Alan Turing and the Invention of 
the Computer. Norton, New York.
Newman, M. H. A. (1955). “Alan Mathison 
Turing, 1912-1954”. Biographical Mem-
oirs of Fellows of the Royal Society 1, pp. 
253-263. 
Sánchez Ron, J. M. (2011). La Nueva Ilus-
tración Ciencia, tecnología y humani-
dades en un mundo interdisciplinar. 
Oviedo: Ediciones Nobel. 
Searle, J. R. (1980). “Minds, brain and pro-
grams”. Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 
3, pp. 417-457. 
Searle, J. R. (1990). “Is the brain’s mind a 
computer program?”. Scientific Ameri-
can, 262 (1), pp. 26-31.
Turing, A. (1937a). “On computable num-
bers, with an application to the Entsc-
heidungsproblem”. Proceedings of the 
London Mathematical Society, 42, pp. 
230-265.
Turing, A. (1937b). “On computable num-
bers, with an application to the Entsc-
heidungsproblem. A correction”. Pro-
ceedings of the London Mathematical 
Society, 43, pp. 544-546. 
Turing, A. (1939). “Systems of Logic 
Based on Ordinals”. Proceedings of 
the London Mathematical Society 2, 
pp. 161-228.
Turing, S. (2012). Alan M. Turing. W. Heffer 
& Sons, 1959; new edition: Cambridge 
University Press, Cambridge.
von Neumann, J. (1948, 1995). “The gen-
eral and logical theory of automata”. 
In Cerebral Mechanisms in Behavior 
– The Hixon symposium September 
1948, L. A. Jeffress, ed. (California In-
stitute of Technology), reprinted in 
The Neumann Compendium, F. Bródy 
and T. Vámos, eds. (World Scientific, 
Singapore 1995), pp. 526-556; see pp. 
551-553. 
von Neumann, J. (2005). Selected Letters, 
Miklós Rédei, ed. American Mathemati-
cal Society/London Mathematical Soci-
ety, pp. 178-179.
